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Decentralized Investment Management:
Evidence from the Pension Fund Industry
Abstract
The past few decades have seen a major shift from centralized to decentralized investment
management by pension fund sponsors, despite the increased coordination problems that this
brings. Using a unique, proprietary dataset of pension sponsors and managers, we identify two
secular decentralization trends: sponsors switched (i) from generalist (balanced) to specialist
managers across asset classes and (ii) from single to multiple competing managers within
each asset class. We study the eﬀect of decentralization on the risk and performance of pen-
sion funds, and find evidence supporting some predictions of recent theory on this subject.
Specifically, the switch from balanced to specialist managers is motivated by the superior
performance of specialists, and the switch from single to multiple managers is driven by spon-
sors properly anticipating diseconomies-of-scale within an asset class (as funds grow larger)
and adding managers with diﬀerent strategies before performance deteriorates. Indeed, we
find that sponsors benefit from alpha diversification when employing multiple fund managers.
Interestingly, competition between multiple specialist managers also improves performance,
after controlling for size of assets and fund management company-level skill eﬀects. We also
study changes in risk-taking when moving to decentralized management. Here, we find that
sponsors appear to anticipate the diﬃculty of coordinating multiple managers by allocating
reduced risk budgets to each manager, as predicted by recent theory, which helps to compen-
sate for the suboptimal diversification that results through an improved Sharpe ratio. Overall,
our results indicate that pension fund sponsors, at least on average, rationally choose their
delegation structures.
Pension funds hold a significant share of the market portfolio. During 2005, worldwide
pension fund assets exceeded $18 trillion, or more than 88% of OECD GDP; by comparison,
worldwide mutual fund assets during 2005 amounted to about $17 trillion.1 While a great
deal of research has focused on the performance and structure of mutual fund markets, such
as Carhart (1997) and Chen et al (2004), surprisingly little research has been conducted on
pension funds. While this omission is likely driven by the scarce availability of data on pension
funds, the large diﬀerences in the structures of pension versus mutual fund markets makes
pension funds a fertile ground for study.
Specifically, mutual fund investors assign their monies to a fund manager with a designated
investment style, and these investments are pooled with other investor assets. Typically, each
investor has a very small share of total mutual fund assets, so the portfolio manager is not
motivated much by the threat of the individual withdrawing her money from the fund. By
contrast, sponsors of defined benefit pension plans typically employ fund managers to oversee
their sizable pools of assets in separate accounts with an arrangement known as delegated
portfolio management. These sponsors are allowed to directly monitor fund management, as
well as having a large influence on the strategy and structure of fund oﬀerings. At one ex-
treme, a pension fund sponsor may employ a single fund manager with a “balanced mandate”
across all asset classes, while, at the other extreme, the pension fund might employ multiple
managers, each with a “specialist mandate,” within every asset class.
The practice of using multiple managers, referred to as “decentralized investment man-
agement” by Sharpe (1981), might at first appear surprising. Specifically, as modeled by van
Binsbergen et al (2008), the unconstrained solution to the mean-variance optimization prob-
lem for a sponsor is usually diﬀerent from the optimal linear combination of mean-variance
eﬃcient portfolios chosen by the individual managers employed by the sponsor. Thus, multi-
ple managers usually lead to a “diversification loss,” since individual managers do not account
for the correlation of their own portfolio returns with the returns of other managers in the
fund. This coordination problem can be reduced through well-designed managerial incentive
contracts, but cannot be eliminated entirely. Moreover, employing separate fund managers to
oversee investments in individual asset classes, rather than hiring a single manager to oversee
1See oecd.org/daf/pensions/gps for pension fund statistics and ici.org/stats/mf for mutual fund statistics.
1
all asset classes, shifts the responsibility for tactical asset allocation (e.g., market timing) away
from fund managers and onto the sponsor.
However, there are many potential benefits from employing multiple managers, especially
as funds grow larger. For example, pension funds can diversify (across managers) the strate-
gies used to generate alpha to exploit the skills of specialist active managers with superior
knowledge of a particular asset class (Sharpe, 1981; van Binsbergen et al, 2009). They might
also employ multiple managers to induce yardstick competition and benefit from the resulting
higher eﬀort levels exerted by these managers (Shleifer, 1985). Such benefits of using multiple
managers can be particularly important for a sponsor with a large fund, given the significant
diseconomies-of-scale in pre-fee returns in asset management.
In this paper, we investigate whether pension fund sponsors have rationally moved to-
ward decentralized management, given the greater coordination problem and higher fees that
decentralization brings. Alternatively, it is possible that the increasing prevalence of special-
ized fund managers is simply due to successful new marketing strategies by fund families to
generate higher asset management fees.
The few existing studies of pension funds (e.g., Lakonishok et al, 1992) do not examine the
eﬀect of the delegation arrangement on performance and risk-taking, due to the nonavailability
of data on specific fund mandates.2 Our paper, by contrast, studies a dataset on UK pension
funds between 1984 and 2004 which uniquely contains, in addition to quarterly returns and
total assets under management (AUM), information on the type of mandate (balanced, spe-
cialist or multi-asset) followed by each pension fund sponsor/manager pairing at each point
in time. For instance, we know the investment mandate type of, say, fund manager A for
UK equities for each pension fund sponsor during each quarter, which allows us to test for
diﬀerences in the performance of manager A in UK equities when the firm acts as a specialist
versus balanced manager, as predicted in the specialization hypothesis of Sharpe (1981). As
2Lakonishok et al (1992) note that up to the early 1980s, most U.S. pension fund managers operated under
balanced mandates, with very few specialists. Brinson, et al (1986) report that, by 1985, this situation had
changed, with most U.S. pension funds employing multiple specialist managers, similar to the UK two decades
later. Lakonishok et al (1992) consider the performance of specialist managers grouped by styles (growth,
value, and yield) but do not have data on specialist versus balanced or multi-asset managers.
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another example, we are able to see whether manager A diﬀers in its risk-taking in UK eq-
uities when it is the sole specialist, compared with when it competes with other specialists.
This allows us to test whether sponsors limit the risk-taking of multiple competing managers,
due to the coordination problem of van Binsbergen et al (2008). Thus, our data allows us
to determine whether particular types of mandates lead to diﬀerential performance and/or
risk-taking, controlling for asset class and manager characteristics.3
First, we investigate whether sponsors employ specialist managers, a form of decentral-
ization, in preference to balanced managers because specialists have superior skills. Our
results show that specialist managers indeed display significant security-selection skills, while
balanced fund managers fail to exhibit any security-selection or market-timing skills, but com-
pete through lower fees. Specifically, the pre-fee performance of balanced managers is less than
that of specialist managers, which is consistent with the higher management fees charged by
specialists.4 Further, the performance of specialists persists, particularly in the case of UK
equities, the most significant asset class held by UK pension funds over our sample period.5
Second, we examine the dynamics of the switch from balanced to specialist managers.
We find that this switch is more likely to occur when balanced managers underperform their
benchmarks, which occurs, at least in part, because of diseconomies-of-scale that arise with
3It is noteworthy that van Binsbergen et al (2008) assume that all managers have equal skills. Therefore,
in their setting, the decision to decentralize fund management (which is made outside of their model) always
produces suboptimal outcomes. Our setting makes no such assumptions; we study performance and risk-taking
in a unified empirical framework, where managers may have diﬀerential skills. As such, besides studying
the decentralization issues highlighted by van Binsbergen et al (2008), we also study the rationality of the
decentralization decision itself.
4Our dataset does not contain information on the fees charged by the individual fund managers, although
we know from industry surveys that the fees of specialists are higher than those of balanced managers, so we
may infer that specialists capture at least some of the rents from their superior skill or greater eﬀort. This
result is consistent with the predictions of Berk and Green (2004).
5These findings are consistent with hidden-action (or hidden-ability) principal-agent relationships, such as
in our pension fund sponsor/manager setting, where the principal oﬀers a menu of contracts to diﬀerent types
of agents to induce them to self-select into particular contracts in a separating equilibrium. In our setting,
specialist and balanced fund managers (the agents) self-select into their preferred contractual arrangements:
specialist managers choose to emphasize security-selection skills, while balanced managers choose to emphasize
lower fees through the management of larger pools of assets across several asset classes.
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increasing fund size. However, even controlling for this size eﬀect, sponsors switch to specialists
to improve performance.
Third, we investigate why the employment of multiple fund managers, another form of
decentralization, is more common in large funds. Sponsors of large funds tend to use multiple
fund managers to reduce diseconomies-of-scale (a benefit of decentralization), but are then
faced with higher fees, as well as the problem of coordinating diversification across multiple
managers.6 We find that sponsors react to this coordination problem by controlling risk levels,
as predicted by van Binsbergen et al (2008). Specifically, fund sponsors appear to reduce the
risk budgets of their managers, such that total pension fund risk is lower under decentral-
ized investment management (a cost of decentralization). Overall, the benefits and costs of
decentralization produce a Sharpe ratio that is comparable with that of funds that have not
decentralized. This implies that decentralization actually improves performance suﬃciently
to compensate for the suboptimal total risk level that results. The shift to decentralized man-
agement can, therefore, be interpreted as rational, since it oﬀers funds with growing AUM a
strategy for reducing the eﬀects of diseconomies-of-scale. Indeed, had funds not decentralized
in order to split assets between a number of fund managers, Sharpe ratios would have fallen,
since, over most of the sample period, the median sponsor’s AUM grow rapidly.
Finally, we find evidence that sponsors employ multiple managers to introduce competitive
incentives for managers to perform well, similar to the incentives for outsourced mutual fund
management documented by Chen et al (2006). Specifically, we find negative abnormal returns
during the four quarters prior to a switch from a single to multiple managers, followed by
significantly improved performance during the following four quarters. We show that most
of this performance improvement can be traced to the incumbent manager, consistent with
the incumbent responding sharply to the threat of a new competing manager in the same
asset class.7 The absolute size of the underperformance prior to the switch averages only 53
6We also find that the dispersion of alphas of pension funds employing multiple managers is lower than
funds employing single managers, which is another benefit.
7During our sample period, funds switched much more frequently from a single manager to multiple man-
agers than the reverse. This should not be surprising, as it is likely that funds begin with a single fund
manager, then switch to multiple managers for a couple of reasons: either they become dissatisfied with the
performance of their fund manager or the fund becomes too large to be managed by a single manager and
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bps/year, however, indicating that sponsors react promptly and switch to multiple managers
before the performance of their single manager deteriorates significantly.
Overall, our paper provides support for rationality in the choice of pension fund mandate.
Decentralization from balanced to specialist managers is chosen when balanced managers
underperform, while decentralization from single to multiple managers is chosen when the
single manager underperforms — which is often a consequence of the increased size of an asset
class within a fund. Further, sponsors appear to understand the costs of decentralization, as
shown by their tendency to reduce the risk budgets of managers when the sponsors move to
decentralization.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In section I, we explain the diﬀerent
types of investment mandates and set out the hypotheses we wish to test. Section II describes
the data. Section III analyzes the relationship between pension fund performance and man-
date type, distinguishing between specialist and balanced mandates, as well as studying the
dynamics of the change from balanced to specialist managers. Section IV explores the eﬀect
on the return and risk characteristics of the pension funds from employing multiple managers
compared with single managers, as well as studying the dynamics of the shift from single to
multiple managers. Section V concludes.
the sponsor may employ several managers without incurring huge fees. Poor pre-fee investment performance
during the periods prior to a switch is consistent with either explanation.
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I. Decentralized Investment Management: Theory and
Empirical Predictions
Following the decision to outsource the investment management of a pension fund, plan spon-
sors must decide on the optimal investment delegation arrangement.8 ,9 In general, sponsors
can choose centralized or decentralized fund management. There are two important dimen-
sions through which the centralization/decentralization decision might be made.
First, the sponsor must decide whether to employ generalist managers, under a “balanced
mandate” or a “multi-asset mandate”; or specialist managers, under a “specialist mandate”.
Under a balanced mandate, the fund manager is responsible for investing across the full range
of assets permitted by the sponsor, such as UK equities, UK bonds, and international equities.
The sponsor chooses the strategic asset allocation (SAA), i.e., the longer-term target asset
mix, usually with the guidance of an actuarial or investment consultant, but the balanced
manager can make both market timing (“tactical asset allocation”) and security selection
decisions. Under a specialist mandate, the manager is allowed to make security selection
decisions within a subclass of assets, and only limited market timing decisions. Under a
multi-asset mandate, a manager can invest in more than a single asset category, but in less
than the full range available to the balanced manager; the multi-asset manager can also engage
in more sophisticated market timing strategies than the specialist manager. As in the case
of balanced management, the sponsor chooses the SAA under the specialist and multi-asset
mandates.
Second, the sponsor might decentralize by using multiple balanced managers (rather than
8In the UK, a pension plan operates under “trust law” (see, e.g., Blake, 2003). This means that a pension
plan is run by independent trustees in the best interests of the plan members. The plan sponsor appoints the
trustees, although up to one third can, if the members choose, be elected by them. Legally, all decisions are
made by the trustees, although they generally delegate investment decisions to investment professionals, and
have a duty to take into account the views of the sponsor. We do not have information on the governance
structure of diﬀerent pension funds (such as information on the trustees). Therefore, for simplicity, we refer
to the “sponsor” as being the decision-maker, even though, legally, this role is held by the trustees.
9Our study assumes that the decision to outsource has already been made by the fund sponsor. Although
this decision is also interesting, our dataset does not include information on internally managed funds.
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a single balanced manager), each of whom invests across all asset classes, or by using multiple
specialist managers (rather than a single specialist manager) within a given asset class. For
instance, a sponsor might split the management of UK equities so that one manager oversees
growth stocks while the other oversees value stocks, or so that one manager uses a fundamental-
based strategy while the other uses a quantitative strategy.
Even more complex arrangements can occur. For example, a sponsor might employ bal-
anced, multiple-asset, and specialist managers simultaneously, as well as employing a single
manager within some asset classes and multiple managers within others. Therefore, it is cru-
cial to analyze the results of decentralization for a sponsor within each asset class as well as
across asset classes to assess the performance and risk eﬀects of decentralization.
I.A. Balanced, multi-asset, and specialist mandates
Figure 1 shows the evolution in the proportion of UK equity mandates in our sample that
follow a balanced, multi-asset or specialist strategy; these proportions are separately depicted
for each of these types, and further separated into proportions of each type that are in single-
or multiple-managed mandates.10 The figure illustrates the secular move by UK pension
funds away from balanced managers towards multi-asset and specialist managers during the
period March 1984 to March 2004. Roughly 99% of portfolios were allocated to balanced
mandates during 1984, but only about 12% by 2004 — at which time 63% of mandates were
multi-asset and 25% were specialist. To facilitate the interpretation of our results, it is of
interest to know whether multi-asset managers are more like balanced managers or more like
specialist managers. Appendix A shows that they are more like balanced managers, although
10To compute these percentages, we count the number of sponsor asset classes managed under each type of
arrangement. For instance, a pension fund with a single balanced manager across all seven asset classes would
count as having seven balanced manager accounts, while a pension fund with a single balanced manager and
seven specialists (one in each asset class) would count as having seven balanced and seven specialist manager
contracts. Also, in the first case, the balanced manager would count as seven single management contracts,
while, in the second case, the mandates would count as seven multiple balanced manager contracts and
seven multiple specialist contracts, reflecting the fact that they are part of a system of competitive managers
within individual asset classes. A virtually identical figure results if proportions by value are used in place of
proportions by number.
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there are suﬃcient diﬀerences not to merge them with balanced managers in our study.
The first dimension of the decentralization decision is whether to employ a single balanced
manager across all asset classes, or to employ a specialist manager within each asset class.
Sharpe (1981) argues that specialists might have superior private information on securities
within a given asset class, giving them better performance than generalists. However, van
Binsbergen et al (2008) argue that the use of specialist managers will result in less eﬃcient
portfolio diversification; they show that a sponsor can minimize the loss of diversification
through a well-designed benchmark choice for each asset class, but that it is not possible to
completely eliminate the negative externality imposed by each individual manager’s optimal
portfolio choice.
In our context, if the movement toward specialist managers is rational, then specialist
managers should deliver better pre-fee performance (as per Sharpe, 1981) than balanced man-
agers to compensate for the diversification loss (as per van Binsbergen et al, 2008) as well as
the higher fees charged by specialists.11 On the other hand, balanced fund managers market
themselves as providers of SAA services across the full range of assets available and are in
a position to take advantage of market timing and security selection opportunities across all
asset classes.12,13 These predictions are summarized in our first hypothesis:
11We do not have information on fees in our data set, but Mercer (2006) surveys global investment manage-
ment fees, and reports that, in 2006, the median annual fee for a balanced mandate is 57 bps/year (of AUM),
whereas specialist mandates command fees from 60 to 100 bps/year, depending on the asset class. Further,
McKinsey (2006) reports, from its survey of US institutional asset managers, that, in 2005, the average as-
set management fee for a balanced mandate was 50 bps/year, while it was 54 bps/year for large-cap equity
specialist funds and 64 bps/year for mid-cap equity specialist funds.
12For example, see Myners (2001, p.75). Although balanced managers sell themselves as providers of SAA
services to all clients — they have more than pension funds as clients — the SAA decision in the case of pension
funds is actually made by the actuarial consultant to the funds’ sponsor who is also employed to value the
pension liabilities. The consultant typically refuses to share with prospective managers any information on
the maturity structure of the liabilities that would help the balanced manager determine an appropriate SAA.
Balanced managers are therefore reduced to the subsidiary roles of market timing and security selection, much
to their chagrin. Balanced managers are generally able to make short-term market timing deviations from the
SAA within boundaries set by the sponsor.
13Obviously, all fund managers would prefer to maximize their fee income, and, therefore, might claim to
have security-selection skills. Therefore, the higher pre-fee performance of specialists depends on pension fund
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Hypothesis 1: The Specialization of Investment Skills: The measured performance and per-
formance persistence (before fees) of fund managers depends on mandate type: (i) specialist
fund managers will exhibit better security-selection skills; (ii) balanced fund managers will ex-
hibit better market-timing skills; (iii) given that there is a diversification loss with the use of
specialists and because of their higher fees, the total performance of specialist managers will
exceed that of balanced managers to compensate; and (iv) the performance of multi-asset man-
agers will be greater than balanced, but less than specialist managers’ performance. Further,
(v) the persistence in performance of specialist managers will be greater than that of balanced
managers, with that of multi-asset managers lying between.
Since moving to a specialist mandate is costly in terms of diversification loss and higher
fees, we hypothesize that a sponsor would expect better performance, adjusting for all other
fund characteristics, when moving to specialists:
Hypothesis 2: The Dynamics of Mandate Switching: (i) The switch from a balanced to a
specialist mandate will follow poor pre-fee performance of the balanced manager and (ii) pre-fee
performance after the switch should significantly improve.
I.B. Single versus multiple managers
The second dimension of the decentralization decision is whether to employ a single or multiple
managers within an asset class. For instance, a sponsor can choose either one or more balanced
managers, each managing across all asset categories. Similarly, a sponsor who wishes to employ
a specialist strategy might hire either one or more specialist managers within each asset class.
Either approach is really a choice between centralization and decentralization.
Figure 1 also shows the trend toward multiple-managed asset classes during our sam-
ple period for balanced, multi-asset, and specialist mandates. Although the use of multiple
balanced mandates within a pension fund has decreased over time, it has increased as a pro-
portion of all balanced mandates. The proportion of multiple manager mandates has similarly
increased among multi-asset and specialist managers. Clearly, pension funds have moved over
sponsors oﬀering contracts to balanced and specialist managers that provide incentives to maximize their
abnormal performance (for a given risk budget). Under such a separating contract, fund managers with better
market-timing skills (but worse selectivity skills) will choose to emphasize market-timing performance.
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the sample period toward decentralization, even within asset classes.
Why might pension fund sponsors consider employing multiple managers? According to
standard principal-agent theory (e.g., Holmstrom, 1982), a principal employs multiple agents
for two reasons: (i) to take advantage of a technology only available to a particular agent,
and (ii) to provide information to induce incentive eﬀects. Under the first explanation, the
principal requires multiple tasks to be performed, and a single agent is unable to perform
all these tasks eﬀectively, particularly when specialist knowledge is required, so the principal
employs multiple agents each with skills in a specific task. In our context, a “value” manager
and a “growth” manager would be examples of specialists within the UK equity class. Since
Chen et al (2004) report evidence of strong diseconomies-of-scale in fund management (before
fees) and Berk and Green (2004) demonstrate that fund diseconomies result from growth in
AUM for successful funds, we would expect that sponsors would be especially keen to switch
to multiple managers when their funds have grown too large for a single manager to maintain
acceptable performance.14
With respect to incentive eﬀects, hiring multiple managers induces an internal yardstick
competition (Shleifer, 1985), allowing the principal to assess the managers’ comparative per-
formance and helping to overcome the problems of shirking and hidden actions. Mookherjee
(1984) shows that, with multiple agents, relative performance evaluation when agents’ outputs
are correlated enables the principal to obtain first-best outcomes.15
14Further, if fund trustees do not know the manager’s true skills, they may want to employ multiple managers
as a way to diversify the alpha risk. Indeed, Sharpe (1981) distinguishes between diversification of style (where
funds employ multiple managers with diﬀerent investment approaches) and diversification of judgment (where
multiple managers are employed to analyze the same subset of securities). The latter is related to uncertainty
about the true level of each manager’s alpha. If fund managers have specialist skills that are not perfectly
known by the sponsor, Kapur and Timmermann (2005) show that pension funds will employ multiple managers
to diversify the risk of employing a low-skill fund manager. If this eﬀect is important, we would expect to find
a tighter distribution of alphas among multiple-managed funds than among single-managed funds. Also, we
would expect sponsors to be especially concerned about alpha risk as a fund grows larger, due to the higher
penalty from underperformance.
15Mitigating this eﬀect somewhat is the manager’s desire to avoid relative underperformance in a yardstick
competition due to career concerns, which may result in the construction of conservative portfolios that herd
around that of the median fund manager (Blake et al, 1999). However, this is likely a second-order eﬀect.
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However, hiring multiple managers again introduces a coordination problem — this time
within an asset class — in addition to the cross-asset-class coordination problem discussed in
the last section.16 Van Binsbergen et al (2008), in their analysis of optimal decentralized in-
vestment decisions, argue that the sponsor will contract with each fund manager in a way that
induces the manager to optimally choose a lower risk portfolio than would be chosen without
the coordination problem. This risk reduction is a way to compensate for the diversification
loss arising from the suboptimal coordination between diﬀerent managers’ portfolio decisions.
The resulting total asset class risk level for a given sponsor is also predicted to be lower with
multiple-manager structures, compared with single-manager structures.
Thus, sponsors should trade-oﬀ higher performance with suboptimal risk-taking when
deciding on a multiple-manager arrangement. In addition, the use of multiple managers
results in higher fee levels, since managers oﬀer substantial economies-of-scale in fees. Our
next hypothesis formalizes these predictions:
Hypothesis 3: The Coordination of Fund Managers: The decision to employ multiple man-
agers aﬀects both fund performance and fund risk. Compared with single-managed funds,
multiple-managed funds will have (i) higher pre-fee performance, (ii) lower risk, and (iii) lower
dispersion of performance to compensate for the decrease in diversification and the higher fee
levels that result from the use of multiple managers.
Fund sponsors might switch to multiple managers within an asset class for a number of
reasons. First, a sponsor might anticipate its single fund manager underperforming in the
future, due to the increasing size of AUM and the corresponding diseconomies-of-scale in
pre-fee fund management. In this case, we would expect the sponsor to hire additional fund
managers, each specializing in a particular sector (e.g., large-capitalization growth). Second,
the sponsor might wish to set up a competition between managers to improve performance. In
16The diversification loss can be reduced, however, by lowering the correlation between returns on the
portfolios of individual managers. One way to accomplish this is to let diﬀerent managers control separate
asset classes (e.g., equities, bonds, cash and property) which are likely to be far more weakly correlated than,
say, diﬀerent strategies within UK equities. Alternatively, within an asset class, multiple managers may be
employed to cover diﬀerent sectors or styles, such as transportation vs. technology stocks or large-capitalization
value vs. small-capitalization growth stocks. Indeed, the vast majority of multiple-manager arrangements in
our dataset involve specialists rather than balanced managers (see Figure 1).
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this case, we would expect managers to cover the same universe of stocks, but to use diﬀerent
strategies. Poor investment performance in the period prior to a switch, followed by average
performance would provide evidence supporting the first explanation, while above-average
investment performance after the switch would provide evidence for the second.
Hypothesis 4: The Dynamics of Manager Switching: (i) The switch from a single to mul-
tiple managers will follow the underperformance of the single manager and will result in sig-
nificantly improved performance. Moreover, sponsors rationally anticipating the eﬀects of
diseconomies-of-scale will switch to multiple managers (ii) before abnormal returns deterio-
rate significantly and (iii) in response to a growth in fund assets.
II. Data
The dataset used in this study was provided by BNYMellon Asset Servicing (formerly Russell-
Mellon-CAPS — commonly known as “CAPS”) and consists of quarterly returns on the invest-
ment portfolios of 2,385 UK pension funds that had their performance monitored by CAPS
at some stage between March 1984 and March 2004. These pension funds hold the assets of
occupational defined-benefit — principally final salary — pension plans. The investment port-
folios of each pension fund are allocated across seven asset classes: UK equities, UK bonds,
international equities, international bonds, index-linked bonds, cash, and property. In addi-
tion, for each unique fund/quarter, the coded identity of the fund manager (or managers) and
the size (asset value) of the investment mandate under management are provided. All the
pension funds in this particular CAPS dataset have “segregated” (i.e., bespoke) as distinct
from “pooled” (i.e., co-mingled) investment mandates. The assets of these pension funds
were managed by 364 diﬀerent fund management companies (FMCs), including external and
in-house management teams.17
Panel A of Table 1 shows the total size of pension fund assets, in constant 2004 pounds,
and the aggregate asset allocation at three evenly spaced dates over the sample period. Our
17The CAPS dataset has coded information on the FMC that operates the investment mandate. We use
the terms fund manager and FMC interchangeably in the paper, even though we have no information on the
specific individuals from the FMC who manage the assets of a specific fund.
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CAPS dataset covers about half (by value) of all pension funds in the UK. There is one
other major provider of pension fund performance measurement services in the UK, and that
organization monitors the other half of the sample. Tonks (2005) argues that there will not be
any serious selection biases in our dataset since any switching between these two measurement
services will be symmetric. Although pension funds may exit the CAPS database because of
poor performance, they will be replaced by poor performers from the alternative measurement
service. The real value of pension fund assets in our sample grew by 262% between 1984 and
1994, and fell by 23% between 1994 and 2004. This contraction over the second half of the
period reflects a combination of the closure of some defined benefit pension plans to new
members (and, in some cases, to further accruals by existing members) and low investment
returns over the period 2000-2003.
The most striking feature of the asset allocation shown in Table 1 is the increased allocation
to UK equities during the first half of the period, followed by a rapid reduction during the
second half. Apart from the fact that the UK equity market in 2000 fell by more than other
equity markets, the reduced allocation to UK equities is the result of the increased maturity
of pension plan liabilities over the second half of the sample period — making volatile equities
a less suitable matching asset — together with a change in the tax rules in 1997 that ended UK
pension funds’ right to reclaim the tax paid on UK dividends. There was some substitution
to international equities over the whole period, so that the total allocation to equities (UK
plus international), by 2004, was almost the same as during 1984. There is a corresponding
inverse pattern in the allocation to UK bonds, with the weighting first falling, then returning
to its original level by the end of the sample period. Again reflecting the increasing maturity
of pension liabilities — a significant proportion of which are inflation indexed — the allocation
to index-linked bonds has increased steadily. Of the remaining asset categories, there is
little discernible pattern, except for a steadily declining weight to property. The three most
important asset classes are UK equities, UK bonds and international equities, which together
account for more than 85% of the total asset value. Therefore, we focus on these three asset
classes in the remainder of our paper.
Panel B of Table 1 shows the number of pension funds and fund manager mandates across
the diﬀerent asset classes for three diﬀerent time periods. UK equities is the only asset class
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in which every pension fund in the sample invests. The table reveals that both the number of
funds and the number of managers have contracted over time. This is partly explained by the
closure of funds and the merger or closure of FMCs, but also by possible switches to CAPS’s
rival performance measurement service.
We have already seen in Figure 1 that there has been a switch from balanced to specialist
and multi-asset mandates, and an increased use of multiple-manager mandates in a given asset
class over the sample period. As well as showing the coded identity of the fund manager em-
ployed by the pension fund during any quarter, the CAPS dataset also reports the investment
mandate under which the fund manager is operating. Table 2 provides further information on
the use of multiple-manager mandates and the move to specialist mandates. Panel A shows
the average size of a fund manager mandate by number of fund managers employed across
asset categories at three diﬀerent dates. Panel B shows the distribution of funds and the
number of fund managers employed for each of the investment mandates, again across asset
classes and at the three diﬀerent dates.
From Panel A, it can be seen that, during 1984, over 80% of contracts in each asset class
were for a single fund manager — as part of a balanced mandate. The remaining contracts
employed two or more managers — as part of competing balanced mandates. The size of the
mandate was approximately constant within most asset classes, regardless of the number of
managers employed. Panel A also shows that, in asset classes such as UK equities, almost
half of all mandates involved multiple managers by 2004. However, in other asset classes, such
as property and the various bond categories, the preferred delegation arrangement remained
single-manager mandates.
Panel B shows that the dominant investment mandate in 1984 was balanced.18 Even during
1984, property was sometimes recognized as a specialist asset category, and our classification
of balanced mandates includes those mandates that were balanced-excluding-property (BXP),
with any property holdings managed by specialist managers. In UK equities, the average num-
ber of fund managers per balanced mandate was 1.26. There were negligible (non-property)
18Note that the number of funds in each asset class is not the same. Although fund managers may have
been operating under a balanced mandate, they might have chosen not to invest in certain asset classes, and
therefore the CAPS data would not include these funds as reporting returns in those asset classes.
14
specialist mandates operating in 1984.
Over time, there has been an increase in the use of multiple-manager balanced mandates (as
Figure 1 shows): by 1994, 35% of mandates were multiple-balanced. However, the proportion
of balanced mandates has fallen throughout the remaining period to around 15% of total
mandates by 2004, as pension funds increasingly turned to specialist and multi-asset mandates.
By 1994, for UK equities, international bonds, and international equities, the picture of a single
fund manager operating a balanced mandate was changing, with an increased use of two or
more managers per asset class. Balanced and BXP mandates had fallen to around 75% of
the total; although they were still the dominant mandate-type, they were being replaced by
active multi-asset mandates and specialist equity mandates. Pension funds were becoming
aware that a single FMC might not have suﬃcient expertise across all asset classes. Some
FMCs claimed superior skills in managing equities, while others claimed skills in managing
bonds.
By the end of our sample period, balanced mandates had largely been replaced by a mix
of active multi-asset, specialist UK equity and specialist international equity mandates. Spe-
cialist equity mandates accounted for 7.5% of the total, covering such specialities as small,
medium, and large cap stocks, global and pan-regional equities, as well as a small number of
passive mandates.19 Similar switches had taken place in the other key asset classes. The mean
size of mandates employing multiple managers, relative to the size of single-manager funds,
had also increased. This implies that it was the larger pension funds that were increasingly
decentralizing their investment management through the use of multiple managers. For ex-
ample, in international equities in 2004, the mean size of the mandate of funds employing a
single manager in that asset class was £35.96 million, whereas, for funds employing three or
more managers, the mean fund size was £62.35 million.
19A text descriptor provided information about the many diﬀerent types of investment mandates. The
“specialist” category comprises a variety of non-balanced, and non-multi-asset mandates, including some
mandates listed as passive, i.e., 6-8% of the UK bond and international equity mandates and 12% of the UK
equity mandates. We, therefore, slightly under-estimate the skills of the active managers.
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III. Empirical Evidence on Balanced vs. Specialist Man-
agers
III.A. Methodology
We now turn to our empirical results, concentrating on the three main asset classes, UK
equities, UK bonds and international equities. The first two components of Hypothesis 1,
namely that specialist fund managers possess security-selection skills, while balanced fund
managers possess market-timing skills, can be assessed as follows.
To test for security selection skills in UK equities, we estimate a four-factor model and
save the intercept coeﬃcients as a measure of the Jensen-alpha in the regression:
rift = αif + β1ifrmt + β2ifSMBt + β3ifHMLt + β4ifMOMt + εift, (1)
where rift is the pre-fee excess return (over a T-bill rate) by fund manager i at pension fund
f during quarter t, rmt is the period−t excess return on the benchmark UK equity portfolio,
SMB t, HMLt and MOM t are the Fama-French (1993) size and value common risk factors
augmented by the Carhart (1997) momentum factor.20 Under the null hypothesis of no-
abnormal performance, αif should be equal to zero. We can test for abnormal performance
across, for example, all specialist pension fund mandates, by testing for the significance of the
average, α¯, when there are F funds and M fund managers in the sample:
α¯ =
1
F
FX
f=1
1
M
MX
i=1
αif . (2)
To conduct inference about the statistical significance of this mean alpha estimate, we use
the residual-resampling bootstrap procedure prescribed by Kosowski et al (2006). For each
bootstrap iteration, we sample with replacement from the fund manager-specific error terms
of Equation (1). Using these innovations, we generate bootstrapped returns using (1), while
imposing αif = 0 to reflect the null of no abnormal performance. We then re-estimate the
20CAPS use the total return on the FTSE All-Share Index as the benchmark for UK equities. We take the
excess return of this index over the UK Treasury bill rate. SMB t, HMLt and MOM t are UK versions of these
factors supplied by Professor Alan Gregory of Exeter University.
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model and obtain a fitted value for each fund-manager alpha for that bootstrap. These are
averaged cross-sectionally to form an average bootstrapped alpha. Repeating this across B
bootstraps, we obtain a bootstrapped distribution of the average alpha estimate, which can
be used to compute the p-value for the average alpha estimate obtained using the actual data.
This procedure preserves cross-sectional diﬀerences in sample lengths across fund/manager
relationships, and, so, replicates the variability in the α-estimates due to heterogeneity in
fund-manager tenures.
To separate selectivity from timing skills, we apply the Treynor-Mazuy (1966) test, using
the four-factor model, augmented by a quadratic term on the excess return on the market:
rift = αif + β1ifrmt + β2ifSMBt + β3ifHMLt + β4ifMOMt + β5ifr
2
mt + εift. (3)
We test for the significance of the average market-timing term, β¯5, using a bootstrap
procedure similar to the one described above. Then, following Grinblatt and Titman (1994),
the Treynor-Mazuy total performance measure (TM ) for each pension fund manager is defined
as:
TMif = αif + β5ifV ar(rm), (4)
where αif and β5if are the coeﬃcients in (3) and V ar(rm) is the variance of the excess returns
on the market.
To test for selection skills in UK bonds, we estimate a two-factor model consisting of the
excess returns on the FTSE-A All-Gilts (GOVB) and UK government consol (i.e., perpetual)
bonds (CONS) portfolios, again measured relative to the UK T-bill rate:
rift = αif + β1ifGOVBt + β2ifCONSt + εift. (5)
The market-timing and TM performance measures are then based on the following estimates:
rift = αif + β1ifGOVBrmt + β2ifCONSt + β3ifGOVB
2
t + β4ifCONS
2
t + εift, (6)
TMif = αif + β3ifV ar(GOVBt) + β4ifV ar(CONSt). (7)
For international equities, we use a four-factor model that includes sterling-denominated
excess returns on the North American (NA) and Europe Australasia Far Eastern Ex UK
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(EAFEX ) stock market portfolios, plus global SMB and HML factors:21
rift = αif + β1ifNAt + β2ifEAFEXt + β3ifSMBt + β4ifHMLt + εift. (8)
We separate the global equity return into North American and EAFE components because of
the evidence in Timmermann and Blake (2005), who show that UK pension fund weights on
North America diﬀered significantly from their corresponding market capitalization weights
over the sample period studied here. Finally, estimates of the market-timing and TM perfor-
mance measures are based on the following equations:
rift = αif + β1ifNAt + β2ifEAFEXt + β3ifSMBt
+β4ifHMLt + β5ifNA
2
t + β6ifEAFEX
2
t + εift, (9)
TMif = αif + β5ifV ar(NAt) + β6ifV ar(EAFEXt). (10)
III.B. The specialization of investment skills: Performance and
mandate type
Table 3 presents percentiles of the distribution of pre-fee return performance for the three
key asset classes. Panel A reports the distribution of mean pre-fee returns measured across
funds. All returns are annualized and are measured in percent per annum. We can see that
the mean of the distribution, as well as the risk, is highest for the UK equity portion of
sponsor portfolios, next highest for international equities, and lowest for UK bonds. Panels
B and C report the distribution of the alpha and beta estimates. The mean annual pre-fee
alpha for UK equities is -7 basis points, while, for UK bonds and international equities, it
is 67 and 30 basis points, respectively. As we will see shortly, these results change when we
condition on the investment mandate. The mean beta results suggest that the models for UK
and international equities are appropriate, while the model for UK bonds is marginally less
satisfactory, since the mean beta estimate is not quite centered on unity.22
Table 4 presents the results of the security selection and market-timing measures of per-
formance for each mandate type, with bootstrapped p-values. The results show that specialist
21As the value factor, we use the sterling return on the World ex UK Standard Value Index (MSCI Barra).
As the growth factor, we use the sterling return on the World ex UK Standard Growth Index (MSCI Barra).
22Neverthless, this was the best equation for bond returns we could find after extensive experimentation.
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managers outperform balanced managers in UK equities under the selectivity measure based
on the alpha from the model that accounts for market-timing skills, (3), and the correspond-
ing measures for managers investing in UK bonds and international equities, (6) and (9).
Specifically, for UK equities, the average pre-fee selectivity alpha for specialist mandates is
a significant 67 basis points per year. The results for the multi-asset mandates typically lie
between the specialist and balanced mandates: multi-asset mandates also display significant
selectivity skills, particularly in international equities, where they exhibit an average pre-fee
alpha of 1.91% per year. These results confirm parts (i) and (iii) of Hypothesis 1: specialist
fund managers display significant security selection abilities, and their pre-fee total perfor-
mance exceeds that of balanced managers. Part (iv) is also supported, as the performance of
the managers operating under a multi-asset mandate falls between that of the specialist and
balanced managers. However, the results for market timing beta fail to confirm part (ii) of
Hypothesis 1, since we do not find systematic evidence that balanced mandates are associated
with positive returns from market timing.23 These results on performance measures contrast
with the results in Table 3, and show that splitting the data according to investment mandate
allows us to identify evidence of outperformance in a way that is not possible when the data
are in an aggregated form.
Previous studies of pension fund performance, including Beebower and Bergstrom (1977),
Brinson et al (1986), Ippolito and Turner (1987), Lakonishok et al (1992), Coggin et al (1993),
Christopherson et al (1998), and Bauer et al (2007) for the US, and Blake et al (1999) for
the UK, have typically found little evidence of either security selection or market timing skills
by pension fund managers.24 However, these studies did not allow for the diﬀering objectives
of pension fund managers, and whether they were operating under balanced or specialist
mandates. We have shown that it is important for balanced managers to be assessed for
market timing skills and specialists to be assessed for selectivity skills.
Figure 2 presents the outcome of a non-parametric bootstrap for the cross-sectional dis-
23The same holds for specialist and multi-asset mandates. This shows that fund managers, whatever their
mandate type, do not possess skills in market timing, consistent with the research on mutual fund managers.
24However, a recent study by Busse et al (2006) did find evidence of persistence in the performance of 1,475
U.S. institutional investment managers in domestic equities and international bonds between 1991 and 2004.
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tribution of the TM total performance measure (selectivity plus market timing) by the three
mandate types, specialist, multi-asset, and balanced, in the three main asset classes. For each
mandate type, we show the percentage of funds that generated a TM performance estimate
greater than expected, as represented by the 45-degree line tracking significance levels between
1% and 10%. For example, in UK equities, we find that 8.5% of the specialists generated su-
perior performance in excess of the 95th percentile of the bootstrapped distribution (which is
computed under the null that managers have no skills), compared with only 6.4% and 6.1%
for the multi-asset and balanced managers, respectively. In general, the top specialists and
multi-asset managers deliver superior performance across all three asset classes, with special-
ists almost always performing the best. In contrast, there is much less evidence of superior
performance for the balanced managers, regardless of the asset class.
An alternative approach to testing Hypothesis 1(i) is to follow Grinblatt and Titman
(1993) and use the portfolio change measure for selectivity, denoted SELi. For each manager,
i, over the life, Ti, of the fund that they manage, we compute SELi across the J asset classes:
SELi =
1
Ti
TiX
t=1
JX
j=1
wijt(rijt − rIndexjt ), (11)
where wijt is the weight in the ith manager’s fund of asset class j at the beginning of time
t, rijt is the return produced by manager i in asset class j during period t, and rIndexjt is the
benchmark return on asset class j during period t. We then compute SELi for each manager
over the life, Ti, of the fund that they manage. Using this measure, we find that the average
SELi is positive and significant for specialist managers (0.63% per year), insignificant for
multi-asset managers, and significantly negative for balanced managers (-0.21% per year) —
qualitatively similar to our regression-based results in Table 4. Further, roughly three times
the number of specialist managers generate a significantly positive SELi estimate (at the 5%
significance level) compared with the balanced managers. These results confirm that specialist
managers are more skilled at selecting securities, especially relative to balanced managers.
To summarize the results from this section, we find evidence largely consistent with Hy-
pothesis 1. That is, specialist managers and multi-asset managers outperform balanced man-
agers, before fees, and their outperformance is due to their security-selection skills. As we
have previously noted, the higher fees charged for specialist mandates (Mercer, 2006, and
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McKinsey, 2006) will dissipate some of this outperformance. We find no systematic evidence
of market timing skills, however, even among managers operating under balanced mandates.
The results, therefore, go some way toward explaining the systematic switch away from bal-
anced mandates over the sample period, despite the diversification loss highlighted by van
Binsbergen et al (2008).
III.C. The specialization of investment skills: Persistence in per-
formance and mandate type
There is little consensus about persistence in pension fund performance. To take some recent
studies, Tonks (2005) finds evidence of persistence in a sample of UK pension funds at the
one-year horizon, whereas Bauer et al (2007) fail to establish persistence for a sample of US
pension plans. Whether persistence might be related to mandate type has not, however, been
explored before. One might expect that the ability to repeat strong performance is highest
among specialist managers, if they are truly the most skilled. Another reason to expect this
outcome is that specialists are more highly compensated than, say, balanced managers. If
fund sponsors were unable to diﬀerentiate between over- and under-performing specialists,
they would be less likely to pay them higher fees.
To test for persistence in the performance of a given fund/manager pairing, we divide the
data into non-overlapping three-year periods. For each period, we first run the performance
regressions, (3), (6) and (9), and obtain the estimates of performance, αˆif and βˆ5if , as well as
TM from (4), (7) and (10). In a second step, we test whether the value of the performance
estimate obtained during one three-year period predicts its value during the subsequent three-
year period.
In particular, to explore if a fund’s prior ability to generate above-median alpha perfor-
mance in a previous period increases the likelihood that it will generate above-median alpha
performance in the current period, we estimate the following regression in the second step:
I{?αif>α¯} = λ0 + λ1I{?αif,−1>α¯−1} + η, (12)
where I{?αif>α¯} is a zero-one indicator variable that equals one when αˆif > α¯ (the median αˆ
across all mandates), and the subscript “-1” indicates the alphas estimated during the previous
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three-year period. We split the funds into above- and below-median performance groups due
to the small number of observations, particularly for the managers operating under specialist
mandates. Identical procedures are followed for the market-timing betas and TM measures.
The estimated coeﬃcients in (12) represent the following probabilities:
p lim(bλ0) = Pr(αˆif > α¯|αˆif,−1 ≤ α¯−1)
p lim(bλ1) = Pr(αˆif > α¯|αˆif,−1 > α¯−1)− Pr(αˆif > α¯|αˆif,−1 ≤ α¯−1),
so λ1measures the probability of future above-median performance for managers with a good
track record (i.e., with previous above-median performance) compared with managers with a
poor track record (i.e., with previous below-median performance). A positive value of λ1 is
indicative of performance persistence, while a negative value of λ1 suggests reversion toward
the mean. Similarly,
p lim(λ0) + p lim(λ1) = Pr(αˆif > α¯|αˆif,−1 > α¯−1),
is a measure of managers’ overall persistence. We would expect this to exceed one-half if
performance persists.
Table 5 shows the results from this analysis. In each panel, the first column shows bλ0+bλ1,
while subsequent columns show the persistence estimates, bλ1, along with standard errors
and t-statistics. The Jensen alphas in Panel A show that specialists exhibit persistent (and
statistically significant) UK equity alphas: 66.7% of specialist UK equity managers with above-
median alphas during a three-year period generate above-median alphas during the following
three years (bλ0 + bλ1 = 0.667). This far exceeds the expected value of 0.5 under the null of no
persistence. There is also some evidence of persistence by multi-asset managers in UK bonds,
but not by other types of multi-asset managers or by balanced managers.
The market-timing measure (Panel B) shows no statistically significant evidence of per-
sistence in any asset class for any type of mandate. However, for the TM measure (Panel
C), we do find much stronger evidence of persistence for specialist fund managers managing
UK equities than for any other mandate/asset-class pairing. Table 5 thus provides evidence
supporting Hypothesis 1(v). In doing so, it again helps to explain (i) the switch to specialists
over the sample period, since UK equities comprise the most important asset class for the
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UK pension fund industry during our sample period, (ii) the switch to multi-asset managers
(particularly in UK bonds), and (iii) the switch away from balanced managers who show no
evidence of either security selection or market timing skills.
III.D. The dynamics of mandate switching
To look further into the motivation behind mandate changes by sponsors, we conduct an event
study. Each mandate switch by a sponsor is included as an observation, so long as there is
no reverse switch during the event window (which is defined as four quarters before and four
quarters after the switch).
Table 6 reports the results of the performance of the fund around the switch from a
balanced to a specialist mandate for the three major asset classes and for the total portfolio.
In particular, we consider the simple benchmark-adjusted returns during the four quarters
preceding the switch, as well as during the following four quarters.25 The table shows that,
for both UK equities and the total portfolio, the average benchmark-adjusted return is negative
before the switch, at -36 and -17 basis points per year, respectively. It is positive for both
UK bonds and international equities. This suggests that it is the poor relative performance
in the dominant asset class of UK equities (which is also suﬃciently large to aﬀect the return
on the total portfolio), rather than in any other asset category, that persuades sponsors to
switch away from balanced towards specialist mandates. The switch is justified, on average,
since there is a statistically significant improvement in performance after the switch in both
UK equities and the total portfolio of 89 and 72 basis points, respectively. There is a smaller
improvement of 55 basis points per year in the UK bond portfolio, while the post-switch
performance of the international equities portfolio deteriorates, although the deterioration is
not statistically significant.
These results confirm Hypothesis 2. An interesting observation is that the pre-switch
underperformance is fairly modest. This suggests that sponsors are concerned that the under-
performance will worsen and switch mandates to avoid this. Balanced managers are penalized
25For UK and International equities, the benchmarks are the FTSE All-Share and the MSCI world ex-UK
index, respectively, while, for UK bonds, this is the ten year government bond total return index. These are
also the benchmark indexes used by the data provider.
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severely for even modest underperformance.
IV. Empirical Evidence on Single vs. Multiple Man-
agers
IV.A. The coordination of fund managers: Competition and man-
ager performance
Do managers perform diﬀerently when they compete with other managers? Shleifer (1985)
argues that hiring multiple managers induces an internal yardstick competition, allowing the
principal to assess the managers’ comparative performance and helping to overcome the prob-
lems of shirking and hidden actions. Our dataset allows us to address this question in a
unique manner, since we have data on the same manager, both when acting alone and when
competing against one or more other managers in the same asset class. For example, we have
pre-fee UK equity returns for each fund manager across many diﬀerent sponsors during the
same time periods. Some sponsors employ a particular fund manager in a multiple-manager
setting within UK equities, while others employ the same fund manager as their sole UK
equity manager. Our data allow us to control for the unique skill of each manager using a
manager fixed-eﬀects framework. Diﬀerences in performance as a result of manager compe-
tition can then be addressed, by considering whether managers perform better or worse in a
multiple-manager setting.
To this end, we conduct, for a given asset class (e.g., UK equities), the following experiment.
Let rift be the excess return for manager i operating in a particular asset class for fund f
during quarter t, and let rbt be the vector of risk factor excess returns (as described at the
beginning of the previous section). In the first stage, we run the regression:
rift = αif + β0ifrbt + εift. (13)
This model allows us to compute the risk-adjusted performance for manager i at fund f ,
denoted radjift = bαif + bεift. We can also compute the average risk-adjusted performance of
manager i, α¯i, across all funds, f , managed, where α¯i = 1Fi
PFi
i=1 αˆif and Fi equals the number
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of funds that manager i works for over the course of his career, in a given asset class. In the
second stage, we run a pooled regression across all funds managed by all managers across all
time periods, for the given asset class:
radjift − α¯i = δ log(REL_SIZEift) + γNMANft + νift, (14)
where REL_SIZEift equals the total net assets at the end of quarter t for manager i at
fund f in a particular asset class (e.g., UK equities) divided by the average fund size in that
asset class during that quarter (across all managers), and NMANft equals the total number
of managers in the asset class at fund f during quarter t.26 This specification captures any
diseconomies-of-scale at the fund level, controlling for the intrinsic skill of a particular manager
— which we would expect to be common across all funds managed by the same manager —
as measured by α¯i. Note that we use relative fund size (REL_SIZE), as we would expect
fund-level diseconomies-of-scale, principally caused by market impact costs, to be driven by
fund size relative to the size of capital markets.27
Panel A of Table 7 shows the outcome of this analysis, separated by mandate type (special-
ist, multi-asset, or balanced). First, note that there is strong evidence of pre-fee diseconomies-
of-scale at the fund level, as the regression coeﬃcient, δ, is negative for seven of nine fund
types.28 Second, the results of Panel A show that there is no evidence that a larger number of
managers results in increased pre-fee performance, as indicated by the regression coeﬃcient,
γ.
This would appear to indicate that Hypothesis 3(i) is rejected. However, the model in
(14) might not be capturing fund management company (FMC) scale-economies. Specifically,
we might expect there to be scale-economies at the FMC level, even though there are scale-
diseconomies at the pension fund level, similar to the findings of Chen et al (2004) among
mutual funds. At the FMC level, economies might be due to spreading fixed costs (e.g., a large
26Note that we suppress the intercept in the second stage, since all variation in radji,f,t − α¯i should be related
to REL_SIZE or NMAN , or should be zero-mean noise.
27We do not have data on the total capitalization of each market for each period, therefore, we use median
fund size in a given quarter as a proxy.
28This finding is consistent with the next subsection, where we will show that large size is a strong predictor
of a switch to multiple managers.
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research team of security analysts) among a greater number of funds; further, large FMCs are
able to recruit and retain the best — and correspondingly most expensive — fund managers.29
Accordingly, we employ another specification that uses the same first-stage regression as
the above model, but uses a second-stage regression that captures the size of the FMC in
a particular asset class (e.g., the aggregate of all UK equity funds managed by the fund
manager):
radjift = c+ δ log(TOT_SIZEit) + γNMANft + νift, (15)
where TOT_SIZEit =
PFi
f=1 SIZEift measures the aggregate assets (in a particular asset
class) operated by manager i at the end of quarter t across all funds.
The results for this specification are shown in Panel B of Table 7. Here, we find strong evi-
dence of economies-of-scale at the FMC level, since five out of nine coeﬃcients, δ, are positive
and significant at the 1% confidence level. This suggests that large FMCs do provide better
performance. We also find that there is now some evidence of a positive competition eﬀect
among specialists, as the coeﬃcient, γ, is positive for each asset class, and is highly significant
in the case of UK bonds. However, there is no consistent positive competition eﬀect among
multiple managers operating under either multi-asset or balanced mandates.30 Therefore, we
conclude that Hypothesis 3(i), namely that there is better performance in multiple-managed
funds compared with single-managed funds, is accepted in the case of multiple managers op-
erating under specialist mandates, but not in the case of those with either multi-asset or
balanced mandates.
29Another possibility is that a particular manager uses a similar strategy across many funds that are managed
in a given asset class. For instance, we would not expect the same FMC to employ a significantly diﬀerent
strategy in managing UK equities for two diﬀerent sponsors. Even if the FMC oﬀers diﬀerent strategies within
UK equities (e.g., growth vs. value), we would expect each of these strategies to be managed in a consistent
way and reflect the house view of the FMC, e.g., with respect to GDP or inflation forecasts.
30The above two specifications assume that diﬀerential performance is linearly related to the number of
managers within an asset class of a particular sponsor, NMANft. In unreported tests, we find similar results
when we use a dummy variable indicating more than one manager, and when we use separate dummy variables
indicating the presence of two, three, or four managers within an asset class of a given sponsor. When we
included both fund and fund manager scale-economies by combining both (14) and (15) into a single equation,
the evidence in support of a positive competition eﬀect is somewhat weaker, except for specialists in U.K.
equities.
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IV.B. The dynamics of manager switching
Table 8 explores the dynamics of the switch from single to multiple managers. Specifically,
we run the following pooled logit regression for each asset class:
Ift = κ+ δ log(REL_SIZEft) + γ PERFft + υft,
where Ift is an indicator variable that takes the value one if fund f switches from a single
manager to multiple managers during quarter t in a particular asset class, REL_SIZEft is
the size of fund f , relative to the average fund size (in that asset class) at the end of quarter t,
and PERFft is the average return in excess of the benchmark for fund f over the four quarters
prior to t. Note, in Table 8, that δ is positive for all asset classes (and statistically significant
for two out of the three), confirming that diseconomies-of-scale are an important driver of
the move from single to multiple managers. A UK equity fund ten times the average size has
an 18% higher chance of incurring a switch than the average fund, while the corresponding
numbers are 48% and 25% for UK bonds and international equities, respectively.
Note, also, that the switch is (weakly) driven by poor previous four-quarter performance
(γ), although this result is not consistent across all asset classes and is not statistically signif-
icant in any asset class. Again, this confirms our above finding of (weakly) negative abnormal
returns prior to the switch from single to multiple managers within an asset class. This in-
dicates that fund sponsors react quickly to decreasing performance that is due to increasing
fund size, before fund performance deteriorates substantially.
As a further test, within each asset class we examine the distribution of fund sizes during
the quarter of a switch from a single manager to multiple managers (in an asset class). To
control for the upward trend in asset class sizes over our period of study, we measure the
quarterly size as the log of the fund size relative to the average fund size across all funds at
the end of that quarter. The results are presented in Figure 3. They show that funds that
switch from a single manager (in an asset class) to multiple managers are, on average, much
larger (during the switch quarter) than single-managed funds, but a little smaller than other
multiple-managed funds. This again indicates that sponsors switch in response to anticipated
diseconomies-of-scale. Within both single-managed and multiple-managed funds, there are
fairly tight distributions of fund sizes, supporting the idea that there is a clientele eﬀect
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linking fund size and the number of fund managers appointed.
The results of this section are consistent with parts (ii) and (iii) of Hypothesis 4: switching
from single to multiple managers appears to be driven mainly by diseconomies-of-scale at the
fund level, and sponsors appear to properly anticipate and make the switch before there is
significant deterioration in pre-fee performance caused by diminishing scale-economies at the
fund level.
However, it remains possible that our results reflect a selection bias. Specifically, a given
fund manager ABC might allocate more talent and eﬀort to some pension fund sponsors, rel-
ative to others. If true, sponsors with poor relative performance might introduce competition
to encourage ABC to improve its performance, with the result that ABC’s performance might
end up being similar under both single- and multiple-manager arrangements.
To further control for this potential selection bias, we perform an event study that focuses
on the returns during the eight quarters surrounding the switch from a single- to a multiple-
manager mandate.31 The first six columns of Panel A of Table 9 examine the performance
during the periods before and after a switch within the three main asset classes. Specifically,
the table shows, for each asset class where a sponsor made a switch, mean benchmark-adjusted
returns, during the four quarters prior to and following the switch quarter. Here, benchmark-
adjusted returns are value-weighted during the period after the switch across all managers
(both incumbent — i.e., not fired — and new managers).32 The results show some evidence of
underperformance during the four quarters prior to the switch among UK equity and interna-
tional equity funds, followed by significantly improved performance during the four quarters
following the switch in the case of UK equities. Although the improvement in performance is
not especially large economically (62 bps/year for UK equities) and only brings funds up to
an average level of performance, fund sponsors once again severely discipline underperforming
managers — in this case, by splitting assets among a larger number of fund managers.
31There are 150-200 switches in each asset class during our sample period. During the sample period, many
funds switched from having a single manager to having multiple managers within an asset class, while a few
funds made the opposite switch.
32Since benchmark-adjusted returns are measured at the asset-class level, we value-weight the corresponding
manager abnormal returns within that asset class. In addition, a sponsor may appear in more than one column
of the table, if the sponsor switched from single to multiple managers in more than one asset class.
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We might expect the competition eﬀect would be especially strong in motivating an in-
cumbent manager who is not fired to improve his performance. In panel B, we conduct the
event study only across funds that moved from a single manager to a multiple-manager man-
date, but also retained the previous single manager. We report the pre- and post-switch
average benchmark-adjusted returns for the incumbent manager. We find stronger evidence
of a competition eﬀect among UK equity and international equity managers: performance
improves slightly more across the switch, relative to the results of panel A, with the eﬀect
being statistically significant in the case of UK equities.
We look further into this issue by examining the impact on the total portfolio, redefining
a “switch” as one that occurs in any asset class of a given sponsor. We define the event this
way because it is possible that sponsors hire additional managers in one asset class (e.g., UK
equities) hoping that their managers in other asset classes (e.g., UK bonds) interpret this
as a threat that they might be subject to similar discipline, i.e., that the sponsor plans to
exhibit eﬀective governance across the full range of assets held. Here, we measure benchmark-
adjusted returns, value-weighted across all the asset classes held by each sponsor. Average
total portfolio performance is presented in the final two columns of panels A and B of Table
9.33 There does not appear to be a strong cross-asset-class competition eﬀect, as the evidence
of negative abnormal returns before a switch at the fund level is weak. Thus, it appears
that managers interpret competitive eﬀects to be segmented, and not common across diﬀerent
asset classes — perhaps due to the diﬃculty of comparing manager skill across asset classes
that have diﬀering levels of market eﬃciency.
We note that the asset-class underperformance levels in Table 9 are relatively small, con-
sistent with sponsors anticipating a decrease in performance due to a growing asset base, with
the corresponding diseconomies-of-scale, and moving to a multiple-manager mandate before
performance degrades significantly. Thus, the secular movement from single- to multiple-
managers appears to be driven by sponsors wishing to avoid underperformance, rather than
trying to improve mediocre performance.34 We, therefore, find evidence supporting Hypoth-
33For example, a sponsor who switches from one to two UK equity managers would be included, even if the
sponsor used a single manager in all other asset classes.
34In unreported tests, we examine the pre-fee returns surrounding switches from multiple to single managers.
29
esis 4(i), namely that there is higher pre-fee performance when there are multiple managers,
at least for UK equity funds. However, this superior pre-fee performance is likely to be oﬀset,
at least partly, by the higher fees associated with employing more managers, each having
smaller AUM. Further, we do find some evidence of pre-fee economies-of-scale at the FMC
level, but, presumably, the FMC captures much, if not most, of this surplus through higher
fees. Unfortunately, our dataset does not allow an analysis of fees.
We now have a motive for why sponsors move to a multiple manager structure. There
is a fairly complex trade-oﬀ between competition, specialization, and fees. Small pension
funds can only aﬀord one manager in order to maximize scale-economies in fees. As the fund
grows larger, the sponsor is able to employ a larger pool of managers to benefit (weakly) from
competition or (especially) specialization and to avoid scale-diseconomies at the fund level.
However, the sponsor very likely pays higher total fees when employing larger numbers of fund
managers.
IV.C. The coordination of fund managers: Competition and man-
ager risk
The appointment of multiple managers can result in significant diversification losses, since
each manager will not necessarily hold a portfolio that optimally diversifies risk with other
managers. In response, as predicted by the model of van Binsbergen et al (2008), the sponsor
should optimally reduce the risk budget of each fund manager to achieve the desired overall
level of risk.
To explore whether pension fund sponsors adjust the risk of their funds when they increase
the number of fund managers employed, we decompose fund risk according to the number of
managers employed by the fund. For each fund, we compute the value-weighted average
returns across all managers within a given asset class. We then perform a 3× 3 double sort,
in which we divide the funds into terciles according to their SIZE (small, medium, large) and
Here, there was no statistically significant underperformance prior to the switch, and there was no superior
performance after the switch. This indicates that the switch was prompted by a diﬀerent explanation, such
as a desire to reduce fund management costs (including monitoring costs), although the number of switches
from multiple to single is too small to draw reliable conclusions.
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the number of fund managers, NMAN (1, 2, 3 or more). We subdivide by fund size, since
portfolio return volatility is highly negatively correlated with fund size (since smaller funds
are generally less diversified than large funds).
For each period, we compute the cross-sectional sample variance in portfolio returns for
each size/manager tercile. We then average this over time to get a summary measure of the
time-series average cross-sectional return variance across funds included in each of these nine
terciles. Hence, our analysis is based on the following measure of the variance (within an asset
class):
σ2SIZE,NMAN =
1
T
TX
t=1
Ã
1
NMANt − 1
NMANtX
i=1
(rit − rt)2
!
, (16)
where rt is the (cross-sectional) average return within a given size/manager tercile, NMANt
is the number of managers in the same size/manager tercile, and T = 81 is the total number
of quarters in the dataset.35
Empirical results are shown in Table 10. They reveal a clear pattern relating fund size,
the number of fund managers employed, and the portfolio risk for the total pension fund
portfolio. Specifically, the larger the fund, and the greater the number of managers, the lower
the dispersion of portfolio returns.
The results are strongest for the total portfolio and for UK equities, but also hold for
the largest UK bond and international equity funds. However, the results are statistically
significant only for the total portfolio and for UK equities, as the following test results show.
To test formally if portfolio risk is declining in the number of managers, the size of the
fund or both, we adopt the monotonic relationship (MR) test recently proposed by Patton
and Timmermann (2009). The null of this test is that there is no particular pattern in the
variance of the portfolios as a function of, say the number of managers, while the alternative
is that the variance is a declining function of the number of managers, regardless of fund size.
For example, if return variance is monotonically decreasing in the number of managers, the
variance of returns on funds with two managers should be smaller than that of single-managed
funds and the variance of funds with three or more managers should be lower than that of
35To motivate this equation, notice that in a setting with homogeneity in funds’ exposures to multiple risk
factors, this measure eﬀectively extracts the average idiosyncratic variance across funds.
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funds with two managers. This must hold separately for small, medium and large funds, giving
rise to six inequalities that are jointly tested. By analogy, we can also test whether return
variance declines as a function of fund size and is jointly decreasing in both fund size and the
number of managers. We report p-values for this test in Table 10. Small p-values indicate that
fund return variance is decreasing as a function of the sorting variable(s). For UK equities and
the total portfolio, we find statistically significant evidence that return variance declines both
in the number of managers and in the size of the fund, whereas for UK bonds and international
equities, the relationships are generally not statistically significant.
As a second test, we compute the average time-series variance of returns for single- and
multiple-managed funds for the full sample, as well as four sub-samples. For each quarter,
we group funds according to whether they are single- or multiple-managed. For each fund, i,
we then compute its time-series variance of returns over the sample period, τ i, for which we
have quarterly return observations for that fund. Only funds with a minimum of 20 quarterly
observations are included in the analysis, and funds that switch from being single-managed to
becoming multiple-managed (or vice versa) are categorized as separate samples, according to
their status during a particular period, in the computation.36 The average variance measure
is:
σ2f =
1
Ff
FfX
i=1
Ã
1
τ i − 1
τ iX
t=1
(rit − ri)2
!
, (17)
where f ∈ (SINGLE,MULTI) represents the single- or multiple-manager sample and Ff
is the number of funds in the corresponding sample. The results are shown in Table 11.
Clearly, multiple-managed funds have, on average, a lower volatility than single-managed
funds. Moreover, these findings are not just a result of multiple-managed funds becoming more
prevalent in the latter part of the sample, since the multiple-managed funds have statistically
significantly lower variance than the single-managed funds in two of three sub-samples.
These results confirm Hypothesis 3(ii), namely that an increasing number of managers
being employed by a fund lowers the volatility of the fund’s returns. Since multiple managers
are more likely to manage diﬀerent security types, or employ diﬀerent strategies, sponsors
appear to be especially sophisticated in setting reduced risk budgets so that the overall risk
36The quarter of the switch is omitted from this analysis.
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is controlled properly.
Earlier, we found weak evidence supporting Hypothesis 3(i), namely that performance is
positively influenced by the number of fund managers. Thus, while we find that the reduced
risk budget under decentralized management does indeed lead to a reduction in risk, there is
no corresponding decrease in performance because of the competition and/or specialization
eﬀects from having multiple managers. Both eﬀects help reduce the impact of diseconomies-
of-scale which would otherwise tend to worsen performance as funds grow larger (see Table 2).
Overall, Sharpe ratios (not reported here) of single- and multiple-managed funds are therefore
very similar (although we cannot observe the post-fee eﬀect with our dataset).
Fund sponsors also face the risk associated with not knowing the true skill of fund man-
agers. An important question that arises from this is whether hiring multiple managers can
help diversify the risk relating to manager alphas. To address this, we estimate the alphas for
both single- and multiple-managed funds using the earlier factor specifications for the three
asset classes in equations (3), (6), and (9). Table 12 provides insights into the distribution
of the estimated alphas along with the standard deviation of these alpha estimates across
the single- and multiple-managed funds. Consistent with Hypothesis 3(iii) that hiring mul-
tiple managers can reduce alpha risk, there is a clear tendency for alpha estimates to be far
more widely dispersed for single-managed funds than for multiple-managed funds across all
three asset classes and across all mandate types. This suggests that alpha-diversification is
an important reason why funds employ multiple managers.
Another way to illustrate this eﬀect is to study the volatility at the manager level and
compare this with the fund-level volatility within a given asset class. For single-managed
funds, these two measures will be identical. However, for multiple-managed funds, the fund-
level volatility might be lower due to diversification eﬀects. We confirm this conjecture. The
average multiple-managed UK equity volatility at the manager level is 18.40% per annum,
compared with only 17.92% at the fund level. The corresponding figures for UK bonds (8.04%
versus 7.90%) and international equity (20.42% versus 19.90%) show a similar diversification
eﬀect. Moreover, the fund-level volatility for multiple-managed portfolios tends to be lower
than the corresponding volatility for single-managed funds (namely, 18.24%, 8.58% and 19.86%
for the three asset classes). This suggests that although individual fund managers that operate
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as part of a multiple-managed portfolio might have more generous risk budgets than those
of single-managed funds, diversification eﬀects operating across managers results in a lower
overall risk for the multiple-managed portfolios. Again, this provides evidence supporting
Hypothesis 3(iii).
V. Conclusions
Decentralized investment management is widespread throughout the institutional investment
industry and, in particular, the pension fund industry. Yet, despite the huge economic impor-
tance of this practice, very little is known about the economic motivation for decentralizing
or about how fund performance and risk-taking behavior are aﬀected by decentralization.
This paper used a proprietary dataset to study decentralization in investment management
in the UK pension fund industry from 1984 to 2004. Over this time period, most pension
fund sponsors shifted from employing balanced managers, who invest across all asset classes,
to specialist managers, who specialize mostly within a single asset class; and from a single
manager (either balanced or specialist) to competing multiple managers (balanced, specialist,
multi-asset or combinations thereof) within each asset class. This secular shift from single
balanced managers to multiple specialist managers carries significant decentralization costs.
As modeled by van Binsbergen et al (2008), decentralization involves suboptimal risk-taking
at the portfolio level, due to the problem of coordinating diﬀerent managers through incentive
contracts. The hiring of multiple managers also increases total fees, which usually exhibit
economies-of-scale.
We have investigated whether these shifts have been rational; that is, whether fund spon-
sors have experienced increased performance to compensate for the suboptimal diversification.
We first examined whether the performance of specialist mandates is better than that of bal-
anced mandates. We found that, after conditioning on fund manager mandates, specialist
managers do display significant security-selection skills, whereas balanced fund managers fail
to display any significant security-selection or market-timing skills; there was also evidence of
persistence in performance by specialists, especially in UK equities, the most important asset
class held by UK pension funds. We further examined the eﬀects on performance and risk
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from employing multiple managers. We found mild evidence to support the conjectures that
competition between multiple managers produces better performance — but this held only in
the case of competing specialist managers in UK equities — and that pension fund sponsors
react to the coordination problem by controlling risk levels: total pension fund risk (and, in
particular, alpha risk) is lower under decentralized investment management. We also found
that the switch from balanced to specialist mandates and the switch from single to multiple
managers were preceded by poor performance; in the latter case, part of the poor performance
was due to the fund becoming too large for a single manager to manage.
Overall, our findings help to explain both the shift from balanced to specialist managers
over the sample period — pension funds benefited from superior performance as a result of
the shift — and the shift from single to multiple managers — pension funds benefited from
risk reduction, via alpha diversification, and from avoiding fund-level diseconomies-of-scale
by employing multiple managers. We interpret these shifts as being rational by pension fund
sponsors, despite the greater coordination problems and diversification loss associated with
increased decentralization.
We note that, following the end of our sample period in 2004, further specialization of
skills in pension fund management has occurred. One example is the emergence of diversified
growth funds which, in addition to the standard asset classes considered in our paper, oﬀer
investments in such “alternatives” as private equity, hedge funds, commodities, infrastructure,
currencies and emerging market debt. While the objective of such funds is to generate stable
absolute returns over an investment cycle with lower volatility than an all-equity fund, it
is clear that the trend documented in this paper of pension funds employing multiple asset
managers with specialist knowledge appears to be continuing.
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Appendix: Analysis of Multi-Asset Managers
This Appendix investigates whether multi-asset managers are closer to specialist managers or to balanced
managers. Under one possible scenario, specialists were first used by large funds because they became dis-
appointed with the performance of their balanced manager. Smaller funds could not aﬀord seven specialists,
so they used lower cost multi-asset managers. These would be specialists in related asset categories (such as
UK and international equities, or UK and international bonds). If this is true, multi-asset managers are really
specialists for smaller funds.
Another scenario is that balanced managers fought back against the rise of specialists by setting up mini-
balanced managers called multi-asset managers. If this is true, there would be no particular link between
fund size and the use of multi-asset managers and no particular link between asset categories oﬀered by the
multi-asset managers.
We investigate these possibilities in two ways. We first measure the number of asset classes multi-asset
managers are generally active in and we then try to understand in what asset classes multi-asset managers
are active. The same analysis is conducted for specialist and balanced managers. The six columns of Table A
contain the following information respectively:
1. The number of observations, which provides the number of “manager/fund/date” triples. We use this
because the number of asset classes in a given “manager/fund/date” triple varies over time.
2. The cross-sectional and time-series average number of asset classes contained in the portfolios.
3. The cross-sectional and time-series standard deviation of the number of asset classes contained in the
portfolios.
4. The percentage of portfolios active in both UK equities (UKE) and UK bonds (UKB).
5. The percentage of portfolios active in both UK equities and international equities (INT.E).
6. The percentage of portfolios active in UK equities, UK bonds and international equities.
It is clear from the table that multi-asset managers are quite similar to balanced managers, yet typically
manage fewer asset classes.
Table A. Mandates Description
Obs. Mean S.D. UKE & UKB UKE & INT.E UKE & UKB & INT.E
Specialist 33944 1.75 0.80 0.89% 21.13% 0.66%
Multi-Asset 18394 4.18 1.34 72.10% 82.73% 65.42%
Balanced 82115 4.89 1.21 78.99% 94.09% 76.25%
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Table 1. Summary Statistics for Funds and Fund Managers
Panel A: Fund Size and Asset Allocation
Asset Jan 1984 Jan 1994 Jan 2004
Amount Percentage Amount Percentage Amount Percentage
UK Equities 64.4 50.7 266.3 57.9 150.8 42.7
UK Bonds 23.0 18.1 9.7 2.1 59.6 16.9
Int. Equities 21.4 16.9 121.3 26.4 94.7 26.8
Int. Bonds 0.2 0.1 15.9 3.5 3.7 1.0
Index-Linked 1.8 1.4 10.8 2.4 32.1 9.1
Cash 2.8 2.2 21.8 4.7 5.4 1.5
Property 13.3 10.5 14.0 3.0 7.0 2.0
Total 126.9 100.0 459.7 100.0 353.3 100.0
Panel B: Number of Funds and Fund Managers by Asset Class
Asset Jan 1984 Jan 1994 Jan 2004 In Existence
Funds Managers Funds Managers Funds Managers Funds Managers
UK Equities 955 113 1044 112 630 82 2385 280
UK Bonds 943 109 652 96 612 61 2319 247
Int. Equities 911 108 1019 118 627 89 2350 279
Int. Bonds 74 22 761 75 210 41 1603 181
Index-Linked 545 75 513 76 412 48 2044 205
Cash 779 108 816 113 463 75 2351 304
Property 718 93 543 86 232 43 1657 184
Note: This table reports summary statistics for the funds and fund managers in our data set. For each
of the seven asset classes, Panel A shows the total size of funds under management in real billions of
pounds sterling (using the 2004 consumer price index as the base-year deflator) along with the portfolio
allocation to each asset class. Panel B reports the number of funds and the number of managers by
asset class. Also shown is the total number of different funds and managers in existence at some point
during our sample from 1984-2004.
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Table 2. Distribution of Funds
Panel A: Distribution of Funds by Number of Managers
Jan 1984 Jan 1994 Jan 2004
# of managers Mean Size Percentage Mean Size Percentage Mean Size Percentage
1 30.87 80.42% 72.06 72.99% 42.44 56.83%
UK Equities 2 32.01 14.76% 62.25 19.83% 45.76 26.19%
3 or more 38.06 4.82% 129.13 7.18% 71.51 16.98%
1 12.33 82.18% 8.66 87.27% 35.45 72.55%
UK Bonds 2 11.98 13.47% 7.80 11.35% 46.05 21.41%
3 or more 14.64 4.35% 24.01 1.38% 51.51 6.05%
1 9.83 81.34% 29.19 75.37% 35.96 64.27%
Int. Equities 2 13.10 14.05% 27.03 17.76% 33.01 23.92%
3 or more 13.58 4.61% 56.69 6.87% 62.35 11.80%
1 2.49 98.65% 5.03 77.27% 6.13 79.52%
Int. Bonds 2 1.77 1.35% 8.89 18.79% 13.42 17.62%
3 or more - - 26.96 3.94% 12.37 2.86%
1 2.23 87.89% 9.31 88.30% 33.40 75.97%
Index-Linked 2 2.88 10.46% 19.98 11.11% 34.45 19.90%
3 or more 1.01 1.65% 21.11 0.58% 47.69 4.13%
1 1.84 82.67% 4.63 79.04% 2.03 68.25%
Cash 2 1.22 13.35% 4.79 14.46% 3.13 21.17%
3 or more 2.73 3.98% 9.05 6.50% 4.72 10.58%
1 16.03 86.21% 14.88 90.79% 26.09 88.36%
Property 2 5.43 11.56% 7.89 8.66% 13.62 10.34%
3 or more 6.38 2.23% 2.63 0.55% 12.78 1.29%
Panel B: Distribution of Funds by Mandate Type
Jan 1984 Jan 1994 Jan 2004
Mandate Funds Managers Funds Managers Funds Managers
Specialist 12 2.33 119 2.03 284 2.17
UK Equities Multi-Asset 2 2.00 173 1.36 384 1.67
Balanced 952 1.26 821 1.36 83 1.46
Specialist 10 1.80 46 1.35 203 1.56
UK Bonds Multi-Asset 2 2.00 103 1.19 399 1.37
Balanced 938 1.24 516 1.14 76 1.34
Specialist 10 2.00 98 1.90 275 1.89
Int. Equities Multi-Asset 2 2.00 157 1.31 365 1.57
Balanced 907 1.25 815 1.34 81 1.36
Specialist 3 1.00 25 1.48 63 1.22
Int. Bonds Multi-Asset 0 0.00 71 1.15 90 1.22
Balanced 71 1.01 676 1.29 64 1.36
Specialist 6 1.33 30 1.37 139 1.47
Index-Linked Multi-Asset 2 1.50 112 1.12 286 1.32
Balanced 540 1.14 378 1.12 24 1.29
Specialist 26 1.92 129 2.09 236 1.80
Cash Multi-Asset 2 1.50 122 1.20 204 1.37
Balanced 766 1.23 631 1.29 63 1.43
Specialist 30 1.27 87 1.21 83 1.13
Property Multi-Asset 1 1.00 66 1.12 98 1.19
Balanced 692 1.17 402 1.10 53 1.06
Note: Panel A sorts the funds according to the number of managers they employ, i.e., a single manager,
two managers, or three managers or more. For each of these categories, we report the average size of the
funds in real millions of pounds sterling (using the 2004 consumer price index as the base-year deflator).
We also show the percentage of all funds in a given asset class that employ one, two or three or more
managers. Panel B sorts the funds according to the manager’s mandate type: specialist, multi-asset
(more than one asset class, but fewer than all asset classes) and balanced (all asset classes). We report
the number of funds as well as the average number of managers operating under each mandate type.
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Table 6. Return Performance around Switches from
Balanced to Specialist Mandates
Quarters Before/ UK Equities UK Bonds Int. Equities Total Portfolio
After Switch Returns t-stat Returns t-stat Returns t-stat Returns t-stat
-4 -0.23% -0.52 0.21% 0.49 2.87% 1.92 0.02% 0.04
-3 -0.79% -1.57 0.63% 1.37 2.00% 1.37 0.05% 0.14
-2 -1.08% -2.67 0.17% 0.33 0.62% 0.46 -0.52% -1.46
-1 0.59% 0.90 0.08% 0.15 2.08% 1.38 -0.22% -0.65
1 1.00% 1.73 0.61% 1.20 0.29% 0.20 0.62% 1.42
2 0.81% 1.93 1.60% 3.51 2.24% 1.77 0.48% 1.37
3 0.56% 1.06 0.84% 1.82 3.57% 2.48 0.83% 2.12
4 -0.34% -0.87 0.18% 0.36 -1.50% -1.12 0.24% 0.58
Performance Before -0.36% 0.27% 1.89% -0.17%
Performance After 0.53% 0.82% 1.16% 0.55%
P-value 0.0060 0.0544 0.7664 0.0040
Note: This table shows the mean returns in excess of the benchmark, and the associated t-statistics,
around the quarters where a fund switches from balanced to specialist mandates. Returns are value-
weighted and computed at the portfolio level, i.e. across all managers employed. In the first six columns,
the analysis is conducted for the three asset classes UK equities, UK bonds and international equities.
In the last two columns, the analysis is conducted at the total portfolio level. The last three rows of the
table report the average performance before and after the switch and the p-value for a difference-in-
mean test for the null of equal average returns against the alternative that the performance in the year
following the switch from a balanced to a specialist mandate is better than the one over the year before
the switch. All numbers are in percent per annum and are based on the full sample from 1984-2004.
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Table 7. Performance, Fund Size and
the Number of Managers
Panel A: Scale-Economies at Fund Level
Specialist
δ t-test δ γ t-test γ Obs.
UK Equities 0.0002648 1.81 0.0001358 0.98 11017
UK Bonds 0.0001032 1.07 0.0000964 0.73 4066
Int. Equities -0.0009035 -3.81 -0.0000473 -0.21 8731
Multi-Asset
δ t-test δ γ t-test γ Obs.
UK Equities -0.0001081 -1.35 -0.0000974 -1.18 13338
UK Bonds -0.0000242 -0.42 -0.0000424 -0.67 10488
Int. Equities -0.0001358 -0.83 -0.0001523 -0.88 12302
Balanced
δ t-test δ γ t-test γ Obs.
UK Equities -0.0001768 -5.14 -0.0001818 -4.75 73045
UK Bonds -0.0000452 -1.61 -0.0000203 -0.55 56889
Int. Equities -0.0001441 -2.00 -0.0000886 -1.09 69958
Panel B: Scale-Economies at Manager Level
Specialist
δ t-test δ γ t-test γ Obs.
UK Equities 0.00000 -0.03 0.00033 1.19 11017
UK Bonds 0.00050 7.08 0.00131 3.27 4066
Int. Equities 0.00071 3.40 0.00080 1.82 8731
Multi-Asset
δ t-test δ γ t-test γ Obs.
UK Equities 0.00024 4.22 -0.00004 -0.23 13338
UK Bonds 0.00008 1.82 -0.00015 -1.08 10488
Int. Equities -0.00026 -2.25 -0.00005 -0.12 12302
Balanced
δ t-test δ γ t-test γ Obs.
UK Equities 0.00049 16.20 -0.00043 -5.82 73045
UK Bonds -0.00013 -5.01 0.00012 1.69 56889
Int. Equities 0.00085 13.38 -0.00010 -0.63 69958
Note: This table presents the results from a two-stage procedure capturing the effect of fund size and
number of managers on fund performance. First, we compute risk-adjusted returns using the factor
models for each asset class described in the note to Table 3. In Panel A, we present a measure of
risk-adjusted returns that controls for managers’ ability across funds and we regress this measure on
the log fund-size relative to the average fund size and a variable indicating the number of managers
active in each asset class, without including a constant. In Panel B, we regress risk-adjusted returns
on a constant, the log size of the manager across all funds and a variable indicating the number of
managers active in each asset class. The coefficient for the size variable is δ, while the one for the
number of managers is γ.
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Table 8. The Probability of Switching from Single to Multiple Managers:
The Effect of Fund Size and Past Performance
δ t-test(δ) γ t-test(γ)
UK Equities 0.08 1.57 -13.93 -1.58
UK Bonds 0.21 3.24 6.35 0.48
Int. Equities 0.11 1.94 -3.96 -1.30
Note: This table reports the results of a logit model of a fund’s probability of switching from employing
a single to multiple managers in a given asset class as a function of the fund’s size (δ) and past
performance (γ). Size is measured as the log fund size relative to the average fund size across all funds
in existence at time t. Performance is measured as the average annual return in excess of the benchmark
for each fund over the course of the previous year.
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Table 9. Return Performance around
Switches from Single to Multiple Managers
Panel A: Fund Performance
Quarters Before/ UK Equities UK Bonds Int. Equities Total Portfolio
After Switch Returns t-stat Returns t-stat Returns t-stat Returns t-stat
-4 -0.57% -1.18 -0.63% -1.52 -1.55% -1.10 -0.69% -1.42
-3 -0.59% -1.10 -0.02% -0.05 1.90% 1.44 0.39% 0.83
-2 -1.24% -2.59 -0.81% -1.68 -0.65% -0.48 -0.28% -0.58
-1 0.22% 0.33 1.18% 2.04 -1.74% -1.25 0.08% 0.13
1 0.28% 0.74 0.09% 0.21 -0.40% -0.28 -0.26% -0.70
2 0.54% 1.78 0.20% 0.50 0.08% 0.06 0.22% 0.65
3 -0.61% -1.43 0.53% 1.27 -0.63% -0.53 -0.51% -1.30
4 0.11% 0.24 -0.45% -1.09 -0.24% -0.17 0.44% 0.81
Performance Before -0.53% -0.04% -0.54% -0.11%
Performance After 0.09% 0.10% -0.30% -0.03%
P-value 0.0345 0.3329 0.4028 0.4039
Panel B: Performance of the Incumbent Manager
Quarters Before/ UK Equities UK Bonds Int. Equities Total Portfolio
After Switch Returns t-stat Returns t-stat Returns t-stat Returns t-stat
-4 -1.09% -1.77 -0.89% -1.47 -3.93% -2.04 0.44% 0.62
-3 0.31% 0.53 0.33% 0.56 2.06% 1.13 0.38% 0.73
-2 -1.13% -2.23 -0.83% -1.07 -0.43% -0.26 -0.32% -0.52
-1 -0.16% -0.25 1.04% 1.76 -1.65% -0.93 -0.03% -0.04
1 0.23% 0.37 -0.48% -0.75 -1.06% -0.50 0.71% 0.99
2 1.51% 2.01 0.91% 1.32 -0.83% -0.45 -0.13% -0.16
3 -0.30% -0.49 0.21% 0.36 -0.54% -0.34 0.88% 1.07
4 -0.34% -0.55 -0.95% -1.57 0.63% 0.31 0.20% 0.33
Performance Before -0.51% -0.06% -0.99% 0.11%
Performance After 0.28% -0.07% -0.46% 0.41%
P-value 0.0374 0.5064 0.3452 0.2716
Note: This table shows the mean returns in excess of the benchmark, and the associated t-statistics,
around the quarters where a fund switches from employing a single to employing multiple managers.
In Panel A, returns are value-weighted and computed at the portfolio level, i.e., across all managers
employed. The analysis is conducted for the three asset classes UK equities, UK bonds and international
equities and for the the total portfolio. In Panel B, returns are value-weighted and computed for the
incumbent managers: the managers that are already employed when the second manager is hired. The
analysis is conducted for the three asset classes UK equities, UK bonds and international equities and
for the the total portfolio. The last three rows of each panel report the average performance before
and after the switch and the p-value for a difference-in-mean test for the null of equal average returns
against the alternative that the performance in the year following the switch from single to multiple
managers is better than the one over the year before the switch. All numbers are in percent per annum
and are based on the full sample from 1984-2004.
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Table 10. Portfolio Variance Sorted by Number
of Fund Managers and by Fund Size
Total Portfolio UK Equities
Size tercile Size tercile
Managers Small Medium Large Managers Small Medium Large
1 0.471 0.335 0.310 1 0.344 0.270 0.208
2 0.393 0.255 0.224 2 0.318 0.188 0.161
3 or more 0.240 0.221 0.189 3 or more 0.279 0.187 0.127
MR test
Size 0.054
MR test
Size 0.000
Managers 0.000 Managers 0.016
Joint 0.015 Joint 0.000
UK Bonds International Equities
Size tercile Size tercile
Managers Small Medium Large Managers Small Medium Large
1 0.184 0.107 0.119 1 0.853 0.615 0.622
2 0.128 0.133 0.083 2 0.847 0.422 0.379
3 or more 0.441 0.121 0.085 3 or more 1.301 0.514 0.378
MR test
Size 0.883
MR test
Size 0.005
Managers 0.902 Managers 0.484
Joint 0.907 Joint 0.283
Note: This table shows the average return variance for funds sorted by the number of managers (one,
two, or three or more), and by size terciles (small, medium and large) and computes a monotonic
relationship (MR) test. Each quarter, we sort the funds into nine categories according to the number
of funds employed and the size of the fund’s portfolio. We then compute the cross-sectional variance of
fund returns for each category and finally calculate the time-series mean of this number. The null of
the MR test is that there is no systematic relationship between the portfolio variance and size, number
of managers or both, while the alternative is that the portfolio variance declines monotonically as a
function of size or number of managers or both variables together. The numbers reported are p-values.
All variances are annualized before being multiplied by one thousand and are based on the full sample
from 1984-2004.
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Table 11. Return Variances for Single- and Multiple-Managed Funds
Panel A: Full Sample Results
Mean of Variances of Returns Funds t-test
Single-Managed Funds 5.54 1473
4.18
Multiple-Managed Funds 5.01 655
Panel B: Sub-Sample Results
1984-1990
Mean of Variances of Returns Funds t-test
Single-Managed Funds 8.30 848
0.07
Multiple-Managed Funds 8.28 281
1990-1997
Mean of Variances of Returns Funds t-test
Single-Managed Funds 2.29 756
3.69
Multiple-Managed Funds 2.10 338
1997-2004
Mean of Variances of Returns Funds t-test
Single-Managed Funds 5.63 538
4.65
Multiple-Managed Funds 5.01 407
Note: This table presents the average variance of returns for single- and multiple-managed funds for
the full sample (1984-2004) as well as for three sub-samples. Each quarter, we group funds according to
whether they are single- or multiple-managed. Only funds with a minimum of 12 quarterly observations
are included in the analysis. Funds that switch from being single-managed to becoming multiple-
managed (or vice versa) are categorized as separate funds. Average variances are annualized before
being multiplied by one thousand.
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Figure 1: Distribution of UK Equity Mandates by Mandate Type and by
Number of Managers: 1984-2004
Note: This figure shows the evolution through time in the percentages of types of UK equity manager
mandates, namely specialists, multi-asset managers (who manage more than one asset class, but fewer
than all asset classes) and balanced managers (who manage across all asset classes), and whether these
mandates were managed within the UK equity asset class by a single (S) or by multiple (M) fund
managers.
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Figure 2: Percentage of Outperforming Funds by Mandate Type
Note: These figures show the outcome of a non-parametric bootstrap test for the cross-sectional distri-
bution of performance measures by three types of managers, namely specialists, multi-asset managers
(who manage more than one asset class, but fewer than all asset classes) and balanced managers (who
manage across all asset classes). For each mandate, we show the percentage of funds that generated a
performance estimate greater than expected, as represented by the “Null of No-outperformance” line.
We use the TM measure of performance as it controls for both market timing and security selection.
The analysis is conducted separately for the three asset classes UK equities, UK bonds and international
equities.
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Figure 3: Distribution of Relative Fund-Size for Single-
and Multiple-Managed Funds
UK Equities
UK Bonds International Equities
Note: These figures present kernel density estimates of the distribution of size for single-managed
funds, multiple-managed funds and funds that switch from a single manager to multiple managers in
the following quarter. Size is measured as the log fund size relative to the average fund size across all
funds in existence at a given point in time. The analysis is conducted separately for the three asset
classes UK equities, UK bonds and international equities.
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